Interpassive Anti-aesthetic by Khan, David










David Khan  
 
This paper explores the implications of Robert Pfaller’s conception of 
interpassivity with reference to a predominantly Lacanian perspective on 
subjectivisation. In so doing, the aim is to engender a conversation 
encompassing art criticism, cultural theory, and psychoanalysis. The 
reference to an “Interpassive Anti-aesthetic” is intended to suggest how 
considerations of interpassivity present challenges to the humanist-
metaphysical prejudices and phantasms of the Western tradition. 
Specifically, it is suggested that interpassive phenomena expose as 
illusory (i) the presumed agency and autonomy of art subjects and art 
objects, (ii) the supposed emancipatory and democratic potentials of 
interactive and participatory artworks, and (iii) the ideological 
underpinnings of postmodernism — particularly insofar as the 
postmodern is defined in terms of its opposition to the modern. In 
accordance with Pfaller’s contention that interpassivity involves “selective 
contact with a thing in order, in exchange, to entirely escape that very 
thing”, on which basis, “Interpassivity is thus a strategy of escaping 
identification and consequently subjectivisation”, two primary moments 
of interpassivity are elucidated: interpassivity-as-delegation and 
interpassivity-as-resistance. The paper presents an understanding of the 
twofold nature of interpassivity in terms of the psychoanalytic treatment – 
specifically, the Lacanian proposition that “the experience of the 
fundamental phantasy becomes the drive” for the “subject who has 
traversed the radical phantasy”. In keeping with Pfaller’s original 
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intentions for interpassivity to provide a way of reflecting critically on arts 
discourse in the mid-1990s, these theoretical considerations on 
interpassivity and subjectivisation are applied to Nicholas Bourriaud’s 
promotion of relational aesthetics and relational art, as well as objections 




In the introductory chapter to his recent collection of essays, 
Interpassivity: The Aesthetics of Delegated Enjoyment (2017), Robert 
Pfaller recalls that he proposed the concept of interpassivity in 1996 —
initially as a way of reflecting critically on a contemporary artworld 
dominated by the discourse of interactivity, with its associated rhetoric 
espousing the desirability of audience participation in the arts. In the first 
instance, Pfaller formulated interpassivity for artists “who were 
responding in complete panic to the pressures of interactivity, 
obsessively pondering about how to and whether they could include the 
audience in their work”. Considered as a kind of inverse correlate of 
interactivity, interpassivity was intended to give artists the means to 
“create a space of distance that would enable a more detached 
observation” of the cultural field in which they were enmeshed.1 As 
originally conceived, then, interpassivity functioned as a critical tool by 
which artists might negotiate the contemporary cultural field and so 
become, if not more genuinely emancipated, then at least more aware of 
the manner of their entanglement within the potentially oppressive 
discourses of interactivity and participation. However, reflecting on the 
situation of the 1990s from a present day perspective, Pfaller observes 
that the “interactivity hype” has largely evaporated (if not, necessarily, 
investment in the notion of participation per se) — a happenstance 
accompanied by a widening of the theoretical scope of interpassivity. 
With the benefit of this expanded viewpoint, it is apparent how, in the 
context of postmodernism and new media, the discourses of interactivity 
and participation constituted a “revival of very old wishes and utopias, 
which had become unquestioned facts”.2 As suggested by the impetus of 
Pfaller’s discussion in the chapter entitled “Against Participation”, among 
the most persistent myths, in this regard, is the idea that art has the 




power to promote genuinely democratic and emancipated social 
conditions in which people might enjoy more complete degrees of self-
realisation and individual freedom. Pfaller’s instrumental point is that, 
insofar as it invests in myths of this kind, the rhetoric of participation in 
the arts and elsewhere is little more than a collection of “hollow phrases” 
that “feign solutions” to a problem (i.e., the lack of social emancipation) it 
actually creates through “the affirmative commissioning of individuals 
under the conditions of postmodern ideology”.3 This demonstrates how, 
latterly, the concept of interpassivity has come to resonate more strongly 
with the concerns of cultural theory insofar as it provides a perspective 
from which to explore the ideological bases of postmodernism. In other 
words, considerations of interpassivity are of utility in exposing the 
degree to which postmodernism — even as it defines itself in terms of its 
opposition to modernism and modernist myths — is itself precisely an 
investment in myth (if not a perpetuation of the very modernist myths to 
which it is, ostensibly, opposed). 
 
 But what is interpassivity and how might we explore its 
implications most effectively? As we shall see, Pfaller offers a twofold 
definition such that interpassive behaviours and structures (i) bear 
witness to a double delegation of one’s enjoyment and belief such that 
other people or things are taken to enjoy and/or believe in one’s place, 
and (ii) constitute strategies for resisting or escaping 
identification/subjectivisation. The terminology employed immediately 
confronts the reader with a variety of potential ambiguities—if not 
outright contradictions. How, precisely, should we interpret the 
suggestion that interpassive phenomena involve other people, other 
subjects—even other objects—enjoying or believing for us? From whose 
perspective is this enjoyment/belief registered? Do the other people 
know that they have been delegated the roles of enjoying or believing? In 
what way can inanimate objects be said to “enjoy” or “believe”? “Where”, 
in any event, do knowledge and belief “reside”? Given that 
subjectivisation names that process to which individuals are subjected 
and by which they become subjects – i.e., a process by which individual 
agency and sufficiency is defined in terms of a relationship with 
something other – is it entirely tenable to speak of interpassivity in terms 




of the delegations and resistances of the one? Even if we allow that what 
we call “agency” and “activity” is inherently intersubjective – a matter of 
subjective relativity as opposed to subjective essence – is there not a 
troubling terminological difficulty in designating the activities of 
delegation and/or resistance as interpassive? In raising these questions, 
it is not our intention to suggest that the notion of interpassivity is, 
necessarily, incoherent. On the contrary, our position is that the critical 
utility of interpassivity obtains precisely by virtue of its apparent 
ambiguities and contradictions. Making sense of interpassivity demands 
that we confront and challenge various humanist-metaphysical 
prejudices and preconceptions vis à vis subjectivity – the exemplary 
symptom of which (in a Western context, at least) would seem to be the 
persistent reification of the powers and privileges of the self-conscious 
individual – the phantasm of the essential self, presumed to be entirely 
present and transparent to itself in acts of thinking and knowing.  
 
 Notwithstanding the seeming infelicity or imprecision of certain 
turns of phrase that may accompany a superficial reading of 
Interpassivity (and, of course, we understand that various concessions 
need to be made in the name of readability, and it is to Pfaller’s credit that 
he is eminently readable), our perspective is that a more considered 
assessment of this text makes it clear that precisely such challenges to 
the tradition of humanist, metaphysical thought are implicit in Pfaller’s 
presentation of interpassive structures and behaviours. Indeed, his 
preoccupation with the aesthetics of interpassivity notwithstanding, to 
the extent Pfaller confronts the reader with challenges of this kind, we 
might be justified in speaking of the anti-aesthetic dimension of 
interpassivity: an “interpassive anti-aesthetic” if you will. The anti-
humanist, anti-metaphysical flavour of Pfaller’s commentary is evident 
from his appeals to Louis Althusser’s conception of subjective “ 
‘interpellation’ ” and Gianni Vattimo’s critique of the “theoretical humanist 
paradigm of ‘reappropriation’ ”.4 Delving further into the writing of 
Althusser and Vattimo, respectively, we find two basic theoretical 
perspectives that commend themselves for the interrogation of 
interpassivity – namely, the conceptions of subjectivity proper to the 
thought of, on the one hand, Jacques Lacan, and on the other hand, 




Martin Heidegger. In what follows, the challenges interpassivity presents 
to humanist-metaphysical conceptions of subjectivity will be explored 
mainly with reference to Lacanian theory, thereby echoing the appeals 
Pfaller himself makes to psychoanalysis – not to mention the positions 
taken by instrumental co-commentators such as Slavoj Žižek and 
Mladen Dolar. On occasion, however, it will be useful to appeal to 
Heideggerian ideas and, in any event, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that any thorough-going commentary on humanist-metaphysical 
prejudices will take place in view of Heidegger’s call for a destruktion of 
Western metaphysics as ontotheology – i.e., the challenging of 
discourses that are excessively essentialist, absolutist, or totalising. 
Furthermore, it will be assumed that readers possess, at least, a passing 
familiarity with the theory engaged with therein – but in the name of 
promoting conversations across scholarly disciplines, our interpretations 
of key concepts will be supported by reasonably comprehensive 
references. Bearing these considerations in mind, let us begin by 
considering interpassivity-as-delegation and then proceed to an 




In the opening paragraph of Pfaller’s text, it is proposed that interpassivity 
is a “mostly unacknowledged form of cultural behaviour” that “entails 
letting others consume in your place” – where “others” encompasses 
“other people, animals, machines, etc.” Pfaller subsequently identifies a 
range of interpassive behaviours or phenomena that include, for 
example, delegating to other people the task of consuming one’s drinks, 
to recording or copying devices the task of watching films or reading 
books in one’s place, to “ritual machines” (e.g., the Tibetan prayer wheel) 
the tasks of praying or believing for one, and to the laugh tracks 
accompanying TV sitcoms and the like the task of expressing 
amusement.5 As Pfaller acknowledges, the examples of the Tibetan 
prayer wheel and “canned laughter” on TV are introduced by Žižek in The 
Sublime Object of Ideology (1989). Here, Žižek refers to the “objective 
status of belief” – i.e., the manner by which belief designates something 
“radically exterior, embodied in the practical, effective procedure of 




people” as opposed to the usual presupposition that belief reflects or 
expresses that which is interior or essential to subjects.6 Žižek points out 
that his account is, itself, indebted to Lacan’s brief discussion, in Seminar 
VII, of the role played by the Chorus in classical plays. Here, Lacan 
observes how the Chorus performs the task of emotional involvement on 
behalf of the weary theatre-goer: “Your emotions are taken charge of by 
the healthy order displayed on the stage. The Chorus takes care of them. 
The emotional commentary is done for you... The Chorus will feel in your 
stead.”7 Also relevant, in this context, is the discussion of “la claque” in 
Dolar’s essay “The Enjoying Machine” (2001). As Dolar relates, la claque 
is a longstanding feature of traditional European theatre whereby 
audience participants are hired to provide applause and other responses 
in their capacity as behavioural guides or supplements to the paying 
audience. The claque, therefore, performs a role directly analogous to 
that of the Greek Chorus, but does so in the audience space rather than 
on stage.8 
 
 In light of these examples of interpassivity-as-delegation, Pfaller 
suggests that interpassive behaviours “are grounded in the preference of 
particular subjects for delegating their enjoyment rather than having it 
themselves”. Ostensibly, this implies that “interpassive people delegate 
precisely those things that they enjoy doing […] Rather than letting others 
work for them, they let them enjoy for them […] they delegate passivity to 
others rather than activity”.9 Subsequently, Pfaller elaborates the nature of 
interpassive behaviours with reference to the example of the intellectual 
who derives satisfaction merely by photocopying texts in a library – texts 
that may end up never being read. The interpassive dimension obtains 
insofar as the act or enjoyment of reading is delegated to the photocopy 
machine or process. In Pfaller’s view, this reveals to what extent 
“interpassive behaviour is always necessarily linked with a seeming 
miniature staging of the act of enjoyment. With the help of the 
photocopier, intellectuals played at reading in libraries.”10 In effect, the 
delegations proper to interpassive behaviours or phenomena result in 
performances whereby the interpassive individual plays at, models, or 
pantomimes a presumably enjoyable activity through another subject or 
object. In the field of object-based art, the performance in question 




involves delegating to the art object the act or enjoyment of observation. 
This pantomime is proper to what, in the second chapter of his book, 
Pfaller terms “interpassive art” – which is to say, “traditional (‘object-
centred’) arts” exemplified by the “masterpiece [that] would observe itself, 
relieving the observers of this task (or pleasure).”11 Indeed, Pfaller notes 
that “Precisely this idea of self-observation by the artwork is seen […] in 
modernism and the classical avant-garde.”12 From the perspective of art 
history and art criticism, Pfaller’s identification of the interpassive 
dimension of modern art clearly resonates with Clement Greenberg’s 
well-known advocacy of formal autonomy. Here, perhaps, one of the 
most familiar examples is Greenberg’s landmark essay “Avant-Garde and 
Kitsch” (1939), in which he suggests that avant-garde artists or poets 
seek the “absolute… by creating something valid solely on its own terms… 
something given, increate, independent of meanings” such that “Content 
is to be dissolved so completely into form that the work of art or literature 
cannot be reduced in whole or part to anything not itself.”13 
 
 At this point, it seems necessary to point out the problems that 
may arise from reading too literally Pfaller’s references to “interpassive 
people” and “interpassive art” – at least, if we are to be rigorous in 
approaching interpassivity from an anti-humanist, anti-metaphysical 
standpoint. In the first place (if this is not stating the obvious), it is 
important to bear in mind that the terms “interactivity” and “interpassivity” 
apply to relations obtaining between entities as opposed to intrinsic 
features of entities. In both cases, Pfaller observes a transference 
between subjects or between subjects and objects – activity or passivity, 
respectively. Pfaller elaborates the nature of the transferences in question 
by appealing to a distinction between work and consumption. On this 
basis, interactivity is said to involve transference of activity through a 
delegation of work from producer or product to consumers. Thus, for 
example, interactive artworks involve a transfer of activity/delegation of 
work from the artist or artwork to spectator-participants. Conversely, 
interpassivity is said to involve transference of passivity through a 
delegation of consumption from the consumer to the product. Hence, 
interpassive artworks involve a transfer of passivity/delegation of 
consumption from spectators who are non-participants to artworks.14 




Strictly speaking, then, there is no such thing as an “interactive person” or 
an “interpassive person” – these terms must be understood as a 
convenient shorthand for a person acting on or with another person or 
thing. Similarly, the expressions “interactive art” or “interpassive art” are 
potentially misleading. More precisely, these terms refer to the art with 
which a person interacts in some way – even if, in the case of 
interpassive art, this “interaction” is apparently negative in nature insofar 
as, from the perspective of the artist or spectator, it resides in delegating 
to the artwork or (as in the case of the “relational art” to be addressed in 
the closing section of this paper) orchestrated art situation the tasks of 
aesthetic observation and even actual becoming as art. By way of 
anticipating discussion to follow, the negative interactions proper to 
interpassive art are synonymous with what Pfaller refers to as “selective 
contact with a thing in order, in exchange, to entirely escape that very 
thing.”15 However, the critical point to take away from these 
considerations is that, depending on the tenor of the relationships that 
are in question at any given time, the expressions interactivity or 
interpassivity may be applied to the very same person or thing.  
 
 Indeed, if interpassivity is (as Dolar suggests) the “reverse side” or 
(in Žižek’s view) the “shadowy… uncanny double” of interactivity, then it 
would seem that, in considering entities and their relations, interactivity 
and interpassivity are opposite sides of the same coin.16 How should we 
interpret this concurrency? On one level, it simply reflects the fact that it 
is possible to think any expression in the field of subjectivity as being 
mediated by either an active voice or a passive voice. Superficially 
speaking, “I observe” (active voice) is equivalent to “it is observed” 
(passive voice). In both cases, there is an assertion of agency: the active 
statement makes this assertion immediately, openly, directly, whilst the 
passive statement does so, mediately, allusively, indirectly. Still further, it 
may be suggested that, in asserting agency circuitously, surreptitiously – 
at one remove as it were – in effect, the passive voice displaces and veils 
the active “I”, thereby eroding its integrity, implicitly placing it in question. 
Compared with the active voice, whose determinations would seem to 
brook no dissent, the passive voice, by contrast, makes assertions that 
are sustained only in their ambiguity. Thus, if interactivity and 




interpassivity are opposite sides of the same coin, then this “coin” (i.e., 
subjectivisation or the identifications proper to subjectivisation) is one 
whose being is (actively) asserted only insofar as, always already, it is 
(passively) undermined, placed in question. Here, we gain some insight 
as to why Pfaller links interpassivity with escaping identification and 
subjectivisation. The “escape”, towards which interpassive behaviours 
and structures gesture, can be understood as akin to what, in Seminar XI, 
Lacan has in mind when he suggests that “the experience of the 
fundamental phantasy becomes the drive” for the “subject who has 
traversed the radical phantasy”.17 In a fashion that echoes Dolar’s 
explorations of the implications of interpassivity in “The Enjoying 
Machine”, I would suggest that the basic efficacy of interpassivity resides 
in its potential to enliven this “traversing” of “fantasy”. In the limit, this 
process engenders a confrontation with the enabling conditions of 
identification/subjectivisation – in the face of which 
identification/subjectivisation as such is subverted or unravelled. Hence, 
in becoming drive, subjective experience per se is superseded by or 
disappeared into its constitutive ground – something Lacan refers to as a 
“headless subjectification, a subjectification without a subject”.18 
 
 Having drawn parallels between interpassivity-as-delegation and 
what we might term the modernist aesthetic position proper to 
Greenbergian formalism, Pfaller’s subsequent appeals to psychoanalysis 
complicate this resonance and, indeed, seem more in harmony with 
postmodern and anti-aesthetic (i.e., anti-formalist, anti-essentialist, anti-
absolutist, anti-totalising) standpoints on art. In particular, the idea that 
interpassivity-as-delegation is neither simply nor immediately an 
expression of individual agency and autonomy becomes apparent when 
Pfaller likens the delegations and performances of interpassive 
individuals to “the substitute behaviours of compulsive neuroses 
decoded by Freud” ≠a key feature of which is, of course, that the 
individuals in question are oblivious of that which drives the repetition 
compulsion (which is of the order of the unconscious and repressed) or 
even, indeed, that they are repeating themselves.19 On the level of self-
consciousness, then, intellectuals playing at reading through photocopier 
machines (and deriving satisfaction in consequence) are unaware of 




their interpassive delegation or performance. Indeed, they would be 
incredulous at the suggestion that they were, in any sense, letting a 
machine read for them– something that would be tantamount to 
anthropomorphising an object or attributing to the machine-automaton 
the privilege of self-conscious agency. As Pfaller suggests, the idea that a 
machine-automaton literally might perform the act of reading in the 
place of a self-conscious agent cannot be regarded as anything other 
than an investment in illusion. That said, Pfaller proposes that not only do 
interpassive behaviours demand the embracing of illusions, the illusions 
in question possess a distinctive character insofar as they are “not merely 
illusions that certain people have never believed in, but apparently 
illusions that no one has ever believed in […] illusions […] entirely 
unsuitable for anyone ever to believe in.” Nevertheless, Pfaller insists that 
it is, apparently, only by virtue of someone’s investment in a completely 
untenable illusion of this kind that we can explain the satisfaction 
attained by the intellectual from the act of photocopying materials that 
will never be read – if not the satisfaction attained through the 
interpassive delegation of enjoyment to others in general.20 And at this 
point, the question immediately arises: who is this hypothetical someone 
who believes the illusion that the interpassive individual cannot? Pfaller’s 
response is instructive for the general approach this paper will take 
towards the topic of interpassivity –namely, that no one, that is, no 
individual subject believes the illusion. On the contrary, interpassive 
phenomena confront us with the spectre of what Pfaller refers to as “ 
‘illusions without owners’ ” or “a new psychic observing agency, only 
touched upon to date by psychoanalytical theory, but not yet 




Pfaller’s understanding of interpassivity-as-delegation in terms of the 
investment in an illusory, naïve observer exemplifies the manner by 
which interpassivity per se presents challenges to humanist-
metaphysical conceptions of subjectivity. However, before proceeding to 
address the implications of the naïve observer in more detail, it is 
important to bear in mind that interpassivity-as-delegation is only the first 




moment in our twofold consideration of interpassivity. Indeed, qua 
investment in illusion, interpassivity-as-delegation may be regarded as 
that which must be negotiated or worked through in order to realise the 
even more provocative and critically efficacious aspect of interpassivity – 
namely, interpassivity-as-resistance. The manner by which Pfaller does, 
indeed, conceive of interpassivity in terms of a movement from 
interpassivity-as-delegation to interpassivity-as-resistance seems evident 
from his suggestion that 
 
[i]n interpassive behaviour, people take up selective contact with a 
thing in order, in exchange, to entirely escape that very thing—and 
indeed, not only, as we have established to begin with, with regard 
to enjoyment, but also with regard to belief; that is, with regard to an 
identification with an illusion. Interpassivity is thus a strategy of 
escaping identification and consequently subjectivisation.22 
 
Here, Pfaller’s reference to the “selective contact with a thing” 
corresponds to interpassivity-as-delegation. The selective contact is the 
interpassive delegation – an equivalence that underscores for us the 
manner by which interpassivity is a kind of obverse, complementary 
interactivity at a distance, in the negative. Moreover, notwithstanding the 
apparent assignment of this mode of interpassivity to the behaviour of 
self-conscious individuals, we have just seen how Pfaller’s invocation of 
the “naïve observer” evidently situates interpassivity-as-delegation 
beyond such limited conceptions of subjectivity. This demonstrates to 
what extent caution is indicated in reading Pfaller too literally or 
superficially: we must be alert to the manner by which certain turns of 
phrase –particularly those which appear to reify the being and agency of 
self-conscious individuals—potentially mask a more nuanced 
complexity. Bearing this mind, the ostensible point being made in the 
passage cited above is that, by virtue of the delegation of 
enjoyment/belief, there is enabled an “escape” from “that very thing”. In 
this “escape”, there becomes visible a “strategy of escaping identification 
and consequently subjectivisation”. It is this “strategy” that is proper to 
what we are calling interpassivity-as-resistance—although, in keeping 
with the caution given above, questions arise as to the precise nature 




and identity of the “who” or “what” that so delegates and resists. Indeed, 
in light of the more nuanced model of subjectivity that the exploration of 
interpassivity demands, even these questions are, arguably, only of 
preliminary importance. Their value resides in enlivening more 
fundamental considerations of the nature of “activity” and “agency” per 
se—which is to say, an interrogation of the binary “active-passive” or 
“agency-automatism”, and a challenging of the tendency to identify these 
as distinct, separable functions, capacities, or modalities of (i.e., 
possessed by, grounded in) particular beings or things (e.g., art subjects 
and art objects). 
 
 Relevant here is the way in which the term “resistance” can signify 
self-conscious, individual agency and a structural automatism that is of 
the order of the unconscious – i.e., the phenomenon of repetition 
compulsion that bears witness to subjectivisation in what we shall refer 
to as its (mal)functioning and/or the manner by which, in Lacan’s view, 
drive “forces” (i.e., sculpts or shapes) desire.23 To the extent that resistance 
may be considered to be an expression of self-conscious agency, it 
harmonises with the privileging of individual self-empowerment and self-
realisation proper to the tradition of Western humanism – of which, in the 
fine arts, the more recent discourses of Romanticism and Modernism are 
exemplary. Thus, one encounters the familiar figures of the artist-hero, 
genius, and avant-gardist revolutionary=whose individual perspicacity, it 
may be noted, typically is directed against a system defined by collective 
conservatism and conformity (e.g., the academy, the art canon, 
canonical art institutions). Of course, the actual situation is more complex 
than this myth in which the avant-gardist individual battles the totalitarian 
cultural collective. The academy or canonical structures of art do not 
define an undifferentiated mass but, on the contrary, an extremely 
heterogeneous constellation of individual people and things; conversely, 
to the extent individual artist-revolutionaries share common values or 
work in concert, they may be said precisely to constitute a collective 
called the “avant-garde”.  
 
 The questions raised by the definition and assignment of the 
categories “individual” and “collective” already signal that modernist 




aesthetics, in privileging the former over the latter, does not tell the whole 
story. However, this is not to suggest that a more complete or objective 
perspective on art and aesthetics may be obtained simply by reversing 
the direction of the privileging—so that the collective or context takes 
precedence over the individual. Such a tactic could not be said to enliven 
more than the most preliminary and superficial possibilities of a 
postmodernist anti-aesthetics, the more complete realisation of which 
demands interrogating the constitutive ground of the binaries “individual-
collective” or “self-otherness” as such, as opposed to merely 
accomplishing their reversal. The figure of the cultural collective is of 
utility insofar as it engenders a way of thinking interpassivity-as-
resistance that does not, necessarily, invest in the humanist privileging of 
individual agency. Thus, contrary to the resistance-for-change that 
exemplifies the stance of the avant-garde artist-individual, it is possible to 
speak of the resistance-to-change that seems proper to the tendency to 
maintain (or return to) the equilibrium of a conservative, homeostatic, or 
entropic structure or system—even though, as we shall see, vis à vis the 
relationship between drive and desire, it is also necessary to consider 
that which disturbs or exceeds this homeostasis in the very constituting 
of it. Moreover, in saying this, we should bear in mind that, ultimately, the 
elucidation of interpassivity demands embracing a model of subjectivity 
wherein the individual and the collective, the self and the others, are 
related dialectically. From this perspective, the functions of “agent-like” 
resistance-for-change and “automatist” resistance-to-change are to be 
liberated from any one-to-one correspondence with, respectively, the 
individual or the collective. On the contrary, the subjectivity defined in 
terms of a reciprocal tension between self and otherness, consciousness 
and the unconscious, also will be defined in terms of a counterpoise of 
agency and automatism, activity and passivity.   
 
 The degree to which Pfaller thinks interpassivity-as-resistance in 
this way is evident from his reference to the “ ‘theoretical anti-humanism’ 
of the concept of interpassivity” and the two theoretical coordinates he 
invokes in support of this position: Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970) and Gianni Vattimo’s The End of 
Modernity (1991).24 In the former case, Pfaller identifies the “philosophical 




common ground” of interpassivity with an Althusserian “mistrust of the 
assumption that ‘activity’ is fundamentally good and that, consequently, 
activating the beholder will always be aesthetically productive and 
satisfying”—a position that, as Pfaller puts it, reflects Althusser’s 
contention that “becoming a subject is one of the key mechanisms of 
ideological subjugation”.25 Here, Pfaller’s allusion is to Althusser’s notion of 
subjective “interpellation”—namely, the way in which ideological 
structures and individual subjects define a counterpoise or reciprocity 
such that “the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology” only 
“insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ 
concrete individuals as subjects.”26 Of immediate relevance to the 
discussion to follow is the distinctly Lacanian flavour of Althusser’s 
argument—specifically, the manner by which interpellation involves an 
imaginary function of recognition/identification (where it is important to 
note that, in Lacanian terms, always already, the function of 
recognition/identification is a function of misrecognition, 
misidentification). Thus, Althusser maintains that “Ideology represents the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” 
and suggests that our sense of self—our conviction that we are self-
willing individuals—is an “elementary ideological effect”: a consequence 
of an “ideological recognition function” that is, at the same time, a 
“function of misrecognition—méconnaissance”.27 With reference to the 
functioning of Christian ideology, Althusser elaborates the ideological 
(mis)recognition function proper to subjective interpellation in terms of a 
“doubly speculary... mirror structure” between an “Absolute Subject” (i.e., 
God) and individual subjects. This structural reciprocity gives rise to a 
twofold paradox such that (i) the Absolute subject confirms its supreme 
autonomy and sufficiency precisely through interpellating the “infinity of 
individuals into subjects” (i.e., “God needs men, the great Subject needs 
subjects”, as Althusser puts it); and (ii) individual subjects obtain a 
transcendental guarantee of their autonomy and sufficiency precisely 
through being interpellated by the Absolute Subject (i.e., “men need God, 
the subjects need the Subject”).28 
 
 Latterly, Pfaller links the Althusserian scepticism of the efficacy—if 
not the very possibility—of purely individual activity and agency with the 




critique of modernist, humanist values presented in Vattimo’s End of 
Modernity. On this basis, Pfaller maintains that interpassivity involves 
“questioning the theoretical humanist paradigm of ‘reappropriation’ ” and, 
indeed, demands interrogating what has tended to be taken for granted 
by “most emancipatory movements since 1968”—of which the tendency 
to privilege activity over passivity, subjectivity over objectivity, and 
mutability over permanence are, for us, among the most instrumental 
prejudices Pfaller places in question.29 In so doing, Pfaller appeals to the 
manner by which Vattimo exposes the modernist-humanist investment in 
(i) the necessity or desirability of human individuals to be engaged in a 
“progressive ‘enlightenment’ which develops through an ever more 
complete appropriation and reappropriation of its own ‘foundations’ ” so 
that, always already, the presentation of the “new” involves a “recovery”, 
“rebirth”, or “return” of a “foundation-origin”, and (ii) the metaphysical 
presumption that the powers and capacities of human individuals can be 
realised “through an appeal to a transcendental foundation” (i.e., God or, 
more generally, the notion of ultimate truth).30 By way of more precisely 
defining the context within which considerations of interpassivity emerge, 
it is worth taking note of the two primary philosophical points of 
reference Vattimo invokes in advancing his critique of western-modern 
humanist-metaphysical values. Firstly, Vattimo makes recourse to 
Nietzschean nihilism, the “entire process” of which may be “summarized 
by the death of God, or by the ‘devaluation of the highest values’ ”—i.e., in 
the context of Western humanist-metaphysical thought, the subversion of 
claims to objective truth and the transcendental ground on which such 
claims depend.31 Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, Vattimo’s 
use of the term “appropriation” to critique humanist-metaphysical 
prejudices is indebted to Heidegger’s conception of Ereignis, the so-
called “event of appropriation”. In harmony with the dialectical model of 
subjectivity this paper advocates for the analysis of interpassivity, Vattimo 
refers to Ereignis as “the play of appropriation and expropriation”32 and as  
 
…the event in which the thing is given... only insofar as it is taken up 
in ‘the mirror-play of the world’ or in the ‘round dance’ (Ring). While 
appropriating itself in this fashion, however, it is also expropriated 
(Ent-eignet), since in the last analysis appropriation is always an 




Über-eignen or transpropriation... the thing comes to Being only as 
an aspect of a total project that, while it allows the thing to appear, 
also consumes it in a network of references.33 
 
Here, Vattimo acknowledges his debt to Heidegger’s essay “The Thing” 
(1951), wherein reference is made to the reciprocal “mirror-play” of the 
“fourfold” (i.e., “Earth and sky, divinities and mortals”) such that “each is 
expropriated, within their mutual appropriation, into its own being. This 
expropriative appropriating is the mirror-play of the fourfold”, in relation to 
which “The fouring presences as the worlding of the world. The mirror-
play of world is the round dance of appropriating... The round dance is 
the ring that joins while it plays as mirroring”.34 In Heidegger’s philosophy, 
Ereignis is a complex and multivalent term, a more detailed treatment of 
which is beyond the scope of the present study.35 For our purposes, it is, 
perhaps, sufficient to observe that, in Heidggerian parlance, Ereignis is 
implicated in the becoming or “clearing” of Dasein as “ek-sistent” “being-
in-the-world”. That is to say, Ereignis is synonymous with a non-humanist 
and non-metaphysical conception of subjectivisation (or, better perhaps, 
the enabling ground of subjectivisation) insofar as it pertains to the 
becoming of a subjectivity exceeding and eluding metaphysical 
oppositions such as inside-outside or self-other.36 
 
Naïve observer to subject supposed  
 
Having identified two primary modes of interpassivity, and having 
clarified how interpassivity, so conceived, presents challenges to 
humanist-metaphysical understandings of subjectivity, we are now in a 
position to explore further what is implied by Pfaller’s suggestion that, in 
the transition from interpassivity-as-delegation to interpassivity-as-
resistance, there is enabled an escaping of subjectivisation. In what 
follows, this transition and escape will be illuminated with reference to 
the clinical situation of psychoanalysis. Our suggestion is that, insofar as 
certain critical potentials are actualised, considerations of interpassivity 
parallel the progress of the psychoanalytic treatment. Thus, the transition 
from interpassivity-as-delegation to interpassivity-as-resistance bears 
witness to a subjective transformation wherein an initial investment in 




illusion is succeeded or supplemented by an investment in the process 
of analysing or interrogating illusions per se. Indeed, as previously 
suggested, in Lacanian terms, the investment in the process of analysis 
as such is, in the (strictly speaking, unrealisable and ideal) limit, 
equivalent to the completion of the traversing of fantasy such that the 
experience of the fundamental fantasy becomes the drive. Herein resides 
the “escape” from subjectivisation to which Pfaller refers: in the limit, this 
escape is nothing less than the very elision of subjectivisation per se in 
the face of drive as a “headless subjectification”.  
 
 At this point, it seems necessary to define more precisely what we 
mean by “subjectivisation”. Superficially speaking, we understand 
subjectivisation to name the manner by which people become 
subjects—i.e., the becoming or crystallisation of subject-hood. However, 
if we are to be rigorous in advancing an anti-humanist, anti-metaphysical 
perspective on subjectivisation, then we must allow that it demands a 
conception of “the subject” as “ex-centric”, “decentred”, “extimate”, or (in 
Heideggerian parlance) “ek-sistent”.37 For this reason, and in a fashion 
that is entirely in keeping with the impetus of Lacanian theory, we shall 
identify “subjectivisation” with the function or operation synonymous with 
the continuous crystallisation or becoming of the field of desiring 
subjectivity—where, moreover, we may take it as read that, in this 
context, “subjectivity” = “inter-subjectivity”. Still further, it is also crucial to 
appreciate that, from a Lacanian standpoint, subjectivisation is 
characterised by its interminability—its perennial failure ever to be fully 
resolved. To this extent, subjectivisation designates a functioning that is, 
always already, malfunctioning; an operation paradoxically predicated on 
the impossibility of its full realisation. It is from this perspective that we 
may understand Lacan’s suggestions that desiring subjectivity defines a 
“relation of being to lack… the lack of being whereby the being exists”, 
and that the subjectivity emerging as “the goal, the end, the term of 
analysis before it is named, before it is formed, before it is articulated, if 
indeed it ever is… is the subject of a becoming”.38 The exemplary 
symptom of the perennial (mal)functioning of subjectivisation is the 
manner by which self-consciousness emerges in the form of a 
fundamentally irresolvable relation of tension with otherness or, 




alternatively, what Lacan refers to as the “big Other”—i.e., for our intents 
and purposes, language-mediated, social and cultural reality, the greater 
part of which is, practically speaking, repressed from the perspective of 
self-consciousness and, therefore, on the level of the unconscious.39 
 
 In the context of a discussion devoted to interpassivity, we shall 
seek further clarification of what is involved in the Lacanian conception 
of subjectivisation—from which process, supposedly, interpassivity offers 
an escape—through a closer inspection of what Pfaller refers to as the 
“naïve observer”. Here, it is evident that Žižek’s Sublime Object provides 
us with a Lacanian equivalent: in Lacanian terms, Pfaller’s naïve observer 
resonates with what Žižek refers to as “ ‘the subject supposed to believe’ 
”—one of three “subjects presumed to...” (the others being “the subject 
presumed to enjoy” and “the subject presumed to desire”) that are 
structurally correlated with and, indeed, whose “function... is precisely to 
disguise [the] troubling paradox” of the Lacanian “subject supposed to 
know” (le sujet supposé savoir), which Žižek terms their “basis” or 
“matrix”.40 In this regard, two points demand our attention. Firstly, we may 
consider investments in “subjects supposed” precisely to be symptoms of 
subjectivisation. Relevant, here, is Pfaller’s understanding of investments 
in naïve observers in terms of the “substitute behaviours of compulsive 
neuroses”—i.e., repetition compulsion. From a psychoanalytic 
perspective, the investments proper to interpassive phenomena testify to 
fixations on the objects or aims of the drives—where, as Dylan Evans 
points out, the drives, in turn, can be understood as “partial 
manifestations of desire”.41 From a Lacanian standpoint, subjects 
supposed—considered as a species of drive objects or aims—are 
illusory or imaginary surrogates for “that” which is, strictly speaking, 
impossible and non-existent: namely, “that” which would fully and finally 
assuage subjective desire (i.e., the Lacanian objet petit a).42 Secondly, 
insofar as they are symptoms of subjectivisation, investigation of 
investments in contradictory subjects supposed offers to illuminate the 
equally contradictory nature of subjectivisation as such—thereby casting 
light on what might be implied by the escaping subjectivisation proper to 
the transition from interpassivity-as-delegation to interpassivity-as-
resistance. By way of elaborating this idea, it is evident that a 




consideration of the subject supposed to know brings to light at least 
three areas of contradiction associated with the function of 
subjectivisation, each of which may be related to the course of the 
psychoanalytic treatment. Our suggestion is that the paradoxes 
associated with the subject supposed to know reflect (i) the 
identifications proper to subjectivisation, on which basis the analytic 
treatment becomes possible in principle, (ii) the apparently contingent 
leap of faith in the efficacy of analysis that, retrospectively, assumes a 
mantle of necessity in relation to the initiation and successful prosecution 
of analysis, and (iii) the Real-as-impossible dimension of subjectivisation 
that defines the horizon of our understanding vis à vis subjectivisation 
and also, thereby, the limits of analysis and, indeed, the efficacy of 





In Seminar IX, Lacan’s commentary indicates that, in the first instance, 
the subject supposed to know may be conceived as nothing other than 
the fantasy of self-consciousness entirely present and transparent to itself 
in acts of thinking and knowing. Thus, the term “subject supposed to 
know” is introduced precisely in order to “radically subvert, to render 
impossible this most radical prejudice... which is the true support of this 
whole development of philosophy.”43 That Lacan’s target is the 
unquestioned investment in the powers and privileges of self-
consciousness is evident from his assertion that “A thought... in no way 
requires that one thinks about the thought... thinking begins with the 
unconscious” and that, furthermore, the knowledge arising from this 
thinking is not to be associated with or grounded in any particular 
subject but is, rather, “intersubjective”.44 In Seminar X, Lacan is even more 
explicit, insisting that “The Selbstbewusstsein, which I’ve taught you to 
name subject supposed to know, is a deceptive supposition. The 
Selbstbewusstsein, considered to be constitutive of the cognizing subject 
is an illusion, a source of error”.45 This dimension of error or illusion 
underscores the first paradox associated with the subject supposed to 
know. It obtains insofar as the investment in a subject supposed to 




know—qua symptom of subjectivisation as such—involves a continually 
failing attempt to sustain identifications between self and otherness—i.e., 
identifications of the form A = B. These identifications are destined to fail 
insofar as the entities involved are not, in fact, identical and, in 
consequence, the identifications in question are sustained only in their 
ambiguity—only insofar as, always already, they evince what Lacan 
refers to as “the effects of fading”.46 Here, we may recall that, in Lacanian 
theory, identification is theorised in relation to the reciprocally entangled 
registers of imaginary representation and symbolic formalisation. The 
former mode of identification is the topic of Lacan’s early essay on “The 
Mirror Stage” (1949), whilst the latter mode of identification is the 
principle theme of Seminar IX. As is well-known, “The Mirror Stage” 
articulates subjectivisation in terms of the formation of the ego—i.e., the 
way in which identifications with visual gestalts (“imagos” or mirror 
images) are implicated in the crystallisation of an imaginary sense of self-
unity and self-sufficiency.47 On the level of imaginary identification, the 
subject supposed to know—qua self-consciousness entirely present and 
transparent to itself in the acts of thinking and knowing—embodies the 
antinomy that, in Seminar II, Lacan expresses thus: “I is an other”.48 By 
contrast, in Seminar IX, Lacan presents an understanding of 
subjectivisation in terms of what is fundamental to the operation of the 
signifier or signification as such. Hence, on the level of symbolic 
identification, Lacan refers to the “origin from which one can see the 
signifier constituting itself” in terms of “pure difference” or a “fundamental 
structure of the one as difference” such that subjectivisation reflects the 
paradoxical identity “the one as such is the Other”.49 
 
 Perhaps some further elaboration is indicated in order to clarify 
how it is that subjectivisation involves identifications of the form “I = other” 
or “one = other” that are sustained only in their ambiguity; only insofar as, 
always already, they are fading. The instrumental point is that, in 
Lacanian terms, subjectivisation—the operation proper to the becoming 
of the field of language-mediated, desiring subjectivity—is synonymous 
with the functioning of the signifier (or of signification) as the becoming 
of difference. In Lacanian theory, this idea is expressed in various ways—
e.g., the linking of repetition compulsion to “significant insistence” or “the 




insistence of the signifying chain”.50 Lacan also theorises signification in 
terms of the “metaphoric function” or the “agency” of the “letter”—where 
the letter corresponds to the “essence of the signifier through which it is 
distinguished from the sign.”51 Here, the distinction in question is that 
obtaining between the essential function of the signifier as the becoming 
of a structure of difference as opposed to the status of the sign as an 
accomplished, determined, concrete entity. Yet another Lacanian 
synonym for subjectivisation inheres in the psychical function of 
repression—as conceived in terms of the reciprocity of repression and 
the return of the repressed.52 In this regard, we have already suggested 
that, by virtue of subjectivisation, the field of subjectivity continually 
crystallises in the form of an irresolvable relation of tension between self 
and otherness, consciousness and the unconscious. Equivalently, we 
may say that subjectivisation involves asserting correspondences 
between certain entities (i.e., identities of the form “I = other” or “one = 
other”) that are sustained by virtue of repressing differences between 
these entities (i.e., as might be represented by the inequalities “I ≠ other” 
and “one ≠ other”).53 On the level of the unconscious and repressed, there 
obtains what Lacan refers to as the “differential battery” or “treasury” of 
the signifier—which we may conceptualise as an infinite field of infinitely 
interconnected pure differences.54 In saying this, we should resist the 
tendency to hypostatise the Lacanian unconscious—a gesture that 
precisely would accord with the metaphysical thinking Lacanian theory 
tends to undermine. Moreover, insofar as the differential battery of the 
signifier is nothing but a structure of differential traces, we should note 
that, strictly speaking, it is fundamentally resistant to imaginary 
representation and/or symbolic formalisation. Nevertheless, for the sake 
of argument, we may (very inadequately) represent/symbolise it like so: 
“…/I/one/other/…” (although, it should be reiterated that, on the level of 
the unconscious, there are no signifieds or determined signs like “I”, 
“one”, “other”, “…”, “/”, and so on). Insofar as, always already, the repressed 
and unconscious field of differences is returning or insisting—as what 
might be conceived as “identities-in-difference” of the form “…/I/other/…” 
or “…/one/other/…”—the aforementioned identities “I = other” or “one = 
other” evince ambiguity and fade.55 On the level of self-consciousness, the 




fading of these identities is experienced as a loss of certainty in oneself 
and in the world at large. 
 
Leap of faith 
 
The second area of paradox associated with the subject supposed to 
know reflects the manner by which investments in subjects supposed to 
know initially present as radically contingent leaps of faith that, 
retrospectively, assume the mantle of necessity. In Sublime Object, Žižek 
refers to this antinomy as “the greatest mystery of the symbolic order”—
namely, the manner by which “its necessity arises from the shock of a 
totally contingent encounter of the Real”.56 I take it that Žižek has in mind 
Lacan’s reference, in Seminar XI, to “the tuché… as the encounter with the 
real” or “The function of the tuché, of the real as encounter—the 
encounter in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the 
missed encounter… in… [the] form… of the trauma.”57 In order to make 
sense of these enigmatic formulations, it is necessary to recall that, in 
Lacanian terms, subjectivisation is temporally complex. The apparently 
contradictory counterpoise of contingency and necessity characterising 
the identifications proper to subjectivisation reflects the way in which 
expressions of subjectivity evince a twofold temporal movement of 
anticipation and retroaction. One of the clearest explanations of this 
principle may be found in Seminar V. Here, Lacan defines the “structure 
of discourse” in terms of a chain of signifiers and signifieds (i.e., 
S1/s1…S2/s2…Sn/sn) such that significations (i.e., identifications, 
determinations of meaning) proper to subjectivisation involve 
 
…an anticipation of the signifying succession, every signifying chain 
opening out before it the horizon of its own completion, and at the 
same time... a retroaction, once there has come naturally the 
signifying term which, as one might say, overtakes the sentence, 
which means that what it produced at the level of the signified 
always has what one might call this retroactive function. Here S2 
already takes shape once S1 has started, and is only completed 
when S2 retroacts on S1.58 
 




What Lacan refers to as the “elementary cell” of the “graph of desire” 
conveniently illustrates this idea.59 Recall that the elementary cell 
comprises a left-to-right horizontal line defining the signifying chain (from 
S to Sꞌ) that is doubly intersected by a right-to-left horseshoe-shaped line 
of subjective intentionality (reading the entire diagram from left to right, 
the two points of intersection may be labelled S1 and S2). We may 
designate the anticipatory dimension of subjectivisation—the “radically 
contingent encounter” with that which is, initially, unknown, mysterious, 
the Real-as-trauma—where the right-to-left horseshoe-shaped line of 
subjective intentionality first intersects the left-to-right horizontal line 
defining the signifying chain (i.e., at S2). The second point of intersection 
(i.e., at S1) designates the moment of the crystallisation of meaning or 
“symbolic necessity” consequent to the “shock” of this contingent 
encounter. That is to say, the moment where, precisely by virtue of the 
identifications proper to subjectivisation, the radical contingency is 
integrated into the symbolic reality of the subject (or, better perhaps, 
encoded into the field of subjectivity) and, thereby, stripped of its 
contingency so that, as retrospectively rationalised, it now bears an aura 
of inevitability; as if, always already, the encounter was predestined. That 
said, we must remember that subjectivisation is defined by failure: this is 
implicit in Lacan’s characterisation of the encounter as, always already, 
“essentially the missed encounter”. Thus, like any identification or 
determination of meaning registered on the level of self-consciousness, 
the sense of symbolic necessity is sustained only in its ambiguity and, 
therefore, destined to fade. This fading engenders the possibility of 
further contingencies fated to be retroactively determined as 
necessary—these subsequent necessities, themselves, unravelling and 
fading even as they are made.60  
 
 As Žižek explains, further, the “mystery” of symbolic necessity 
arising from radical contingency is, “in the final analysis, the mystery of 
the transference itself: to produce new meaning, it is necessary to 
presuppose its existence in the other.”61 Let us unpack Žižek’s remarks—
beginning, perhaps, with how subjectivisation relates to the 
phenomenon of the transference, before moving on to consider the Real 
(which is of relevance to the third area of contradiction associated with 




the subject supposed to know). In relation to the transference, the critical 
point to bear in mind is that the structural logic of the identifications 
proper to subjectivisation (i.e., the manner by which, always already, self-
consciousness exists in a relation of tension with otherness) necessarily 
implies that the conscious one thinks and knows only insofar as others 
think and know—regardless of whether this is acknowledged on the level 
of self-consciousness.62 To put the matter in equivalent terms, we may 
say that, always already, the conscious one invests in the subject 
supposed to know only insofar as it is encoded in the Other of language-
mediated culture and society. Always already, then, the signifier or sign 
“subject supposed to know” and its signifying conjugates (i.e., relations of 
similarity and difference with the infinity of other signifiers in the signifying 
constellation that is the Other) is given to one: the conscious one invests 
in the idea of the subject supposed to know only insofar as it is given to 
so invest by the Other. The idea that one knows or believes only insofar 
as one is given to know or believe by virtue of the knowledge/belief in 
question always already being encoded in the Other is precisely what 
Žižek has in mind when he refers to the “objective status of belief”. 
However, this is not to suggest that human beings are, simply and 
immediately, culturally programmed automatons. Rather, the “objective” 
nature of knowledge or belief forces us to confront certain humanist-
metaphysical preconceptions about the nature of subjective being and 
agency per se—specifically, (i) the idea that agency is the essential 
characteristic of self-conscious individuals, entirely transparent and 
present to themselves in acts of thinking and knowing, and (ii) the idea 
that agency/activity is fundamentally incompatible with, or operates in 
complete isolation from, automatism/passivity. 
 
 In the context of the psychoanalytic clinic, the paradoxical 
counterpoise of contingency and necessity is intrinsic to the 
transference. As Lacan observes in Seminar XI, “As soon as the subject 
who is supposed to know exists somewhere... there is transference”—i.e., 
as Evans puts it, “the attribution of knowledge to the Other.”63 Lacan goes 
on to assert that, in the context of the psychoanalytic clinic, transference 
is “established” when, from the perspective of the analysand, the 
“function” of the subject supposed to know is “embodied” by the analyst.64 




That is to say, analysis is initiated on the basis of the analysand’s belief 
that the analyst has the answer to the analysand’s question—i.e., by 
virtue of the analysand’s identification with the analyst who, from the 
perspective of the analysand, is considered to be a subject supposed to 
know. In Seminar XV, discussing “what is effectively involved in the 
necessary pre-supposition of the psychoanalytic act”, Lacan likens the 
nature of the identification in question to “an act of faith... in the subject 
supposed to know”.65 In this regard, Seminar XV applies to the 
psychoanalytic clinic a principle Lacan had previously invoked, in 
Seminar XI, in relation to epistemological enquiry in general. Namely, the 
account of Descartes’ appeal to God as transcendental guarantor of the 
validity of the cogito such that, in (mis)conceiving of the cogito as a kind 
of knowledge, Descartes “puts the field of this knowledge at the level of 
this vaster subject, the subject supposed to know, God.”66 That said, 
Lacan’s remarks vis à vis the Cartesian method’s prioritisation of the 
ordinal over the cardinal (i.e., the order of operations as opposed to the 
number or accumulative results of the operations) and its employment of 
small letters to designate algebraic unknowns reveals to what degree 
Descartes’ investment in God as a subject supposed to know is a 
necessary step in the creation of “the initial bases of a science in which 
God has nothing to do.”67  
 
 A brief inspection of Kant’s so-called “principle of reflective 
judgement”, as introduced in the Critique of Judgement (1790), provides 
further illustration of the point Lacan is making. Namely, that a leap of 
faith in a subject supposed to know is a necessary prerequisite for the 
creation of a systematic science in which the heterogeneity of empirical 
experience may be unified under universal laws. Here, we may recall 
that, for Kant, the faculty of reflective judgement—i.e., the capacity to 
judge in the absence of determinate concepts—is not only characteristic 
of aesthetic experience but also that which defines the ground of 
“cognition in general”.68 What is relevant to our considerations of the 
subject supposed to know is Kant’s contention that reflective judgement 
involves the positing of a “transcendental principle”—i.e., the a priori 
concept of the “finality of nature”—that has no objective ground; it is, 
rather, that which “the reflective judgement can only give as a law from 




and to itself.”69 Ultimately, this boils down to the presumption that what 
seems “contingent in the particular (empirical) laws of nature contains 
nevertheless unity of law… unfathomable… unthinkable… as such unity 
may, no doubt, be for us.” In Kant’s view, without this presupposition that 
a “systematic unity” underlies the heterogeneity of empirical particulars, 
“we should have no order of nature in accordance with empirical laws… 
no guiding thread” by which to “discover in nature an intelligible order”.70 
In short, for Kant, the very possibility of empirical science depends on a 
leap of faith in the efficacy of empirical investigation per se—in effect, a 
leap of faith in an abstract transcendental principle or depersonalised 




To some degree, Kant’s investment in a subject supposed to know as 
abstracted or depersonalised prefigures Lacan’s suggestion, in Seminar 
XV, that the end or “term of analysis consists in the fall of the subject 
supposed to know and his reduction to the arrival of this o-object, as 
cause of the division of the subject which comes in its place” in “the act if 
there is one, which carries [the analysand] to become a psychoanalyst”.71 
In other words, during the course of analysis, in the process of working 
through the transference, the analysand undergoes a transformation 
whereby they relinquish their initial identification with the analyst 
considered to be a subject supposed to know—i.e., a subject defined in 
terms of the positive condition of knowing fully and absolutely. Instead, 
the analysand becoming as an analyst identifies with the analyst 
“reduced” to the “o-object” (i.e., objet petit a as it is rendered in Cormac 
Gallagher’s translation). Hence, this latter identification is with a “subject” 
defined negatively in terms of objet a—an ineffable nothingness, 
hypothetically posited as “cause” of subjectivisation and thus source of 
the irresolvable tension between self and otherness, consciousness and 
the unconscious defining the subjective field. Equivalently, we may say 
that the course of the psychoanalytic treatment bears witness to the 
abandonment of identifications directed towards the impossible ideal of 
subjectivisation fully realised in favour of identification with the 
inescapable actuality of subjectivisation as failure. In consequence, the 




analysand becoming as an analyst ceases to look for “the answer” to the 
question of their desire in the analyst (i.e., via an identification with a 
concrete, replete, personified subject supposed to know), in favour of 
investing in the inherently open-ended activity of questioning, 
interpretation, analysis per se (i.e., via an identification with an 
abstracted, evacuated, de-personified subject supposed to know). 
 
 As previously suggested, in the context of our considerations of 
interpassivity, the “term” of analysis may be equated with the theoretical 
completion of the movement from interpassivity-as-delegation to 
interpassivity-as-resistance—which is to say, the completion of the 
traversing of fantasy so that the experience of the fundamental fantasy 
(i.e., the investment in self-consciousness and its corollary—the subject 
supposed) becomes drive. In the process, investments in illusory 
subjects supposed are superseded by investment in the process of 
analysis per se. Here, however, it must be emphasised that this latter 
investment is neither simply nor immediately that which “belongs” to the 
conscious one. On the contrary, it is an investment by virtue of which the 
conscious one and its relation of tension with otherness is vanished; 
rendered null and void in the face of drive as a “headless 
subjectification”. Hence, the “escaping” subjectivisation, to which Pfaller 
refers, defines an ideal limit or horizon of subjectivisation where the 
“escape” in question would seem to be synonymous with the 
superseding of subjectivisation as such. This underscores for us the 
correlation between subjectivisation defined in terms of an irresolvable, 
interminable relation of tension between self and otherness, 
consciousness and the unconscious, and what might be termed the 
interminability of analysis per se—such that the “end” of analysis is, 
perhaps, better understood as an aim or ideal as opposed to a final 
destination. That the completion of traversing fantasy (hence, the 
complete subversion of identification/subjectivisation in becoming drive) 
is an unrealisable objective would seem evident from Lacan’s insistence 
that this “beyond of analysis… has never been approached” or “Up to 
now, it has been approachable only at the level of the analyst” in the so-
called “training analysis… a psychoanalysis that has… specifically 




traversed the cycle of the analytic experience in its totality… looped this 
loop to its end”, where “The loop must be run through several times.”72 
 
 What is implied by this correlation obtaining between the 
irresolution of subjectivisation (i.e., its intrinsic (mal)functioning) and the 
interminability of analysis? Our suggestion is that, variously, the 
experience of the fundamental fantasy becoming drive, the identification 
with the analyst reduced to objet a, and the escaping subjectivisation 
proper to interpassivity-as-resistance must be regarded as hypotheticals 
defining the horizon of subjectivisation as such. This brings us to a 
consideration of the third area of contradiction associated with the 
subject supposed to know—namely, its relationship to the Lacanian Real. 
Relevant, here, is the identity Žižek establishes, in Sublime Object, 
between objet a and the subject supposed to know. The equivalence in 
question obtains insofar as Žižek posits the Real as an “entity” that must 
be retrospectively “constructed” in order to “account for the distortions of 
the symbolic structure”—i.e., the ambiguities or, indeed, outright 
contradictions in the field of language-mediated, desiring subjectivity that 
are symptomatic of failures in subjectivisation.73 As Žižek points out, this 
means that the Lacanian Real itself is contradictory or impossible insofar 
as “it does not exist” yet possesses “a series of properties” and “exercises 
a certain structural causality” such that “it can produce a series of effects 
in the symbolic reality of subjects.” In Lacanian terms, this entity is, of 
course, objet a—less an object per se than a “cause which in itself does 
not exist—which is present only in a series of effects, but always in a 
distorted, displaced way.” The aforementioned identity between objet a 
and the subject supposed to know obtains when Žižek subsequently 
characterises the subject supposed to know as such a “real entity” 
insofar as it also “does not exist, but it produces a decisive shift in the 
development of the psychoanalytic cure.”74   
 
 At this point, the reader may be experiencing some difficulty in 
reconciling the the subject supposed to know as illusory with Žižek’s 
characterisation of it as a causative “real entity”—not to mention his 
concurrent claim that the structural correlates of the subject supposed to 
know serve to “disguise” its “troubling paradox”. In the first place, it is 




important to bear in mind that, insofar as investments in subjects 
supposed to know are investments in illusions, they are symptoms of 
failures in subjectivisation as expressed in Imaginary and Symbolic 
registers. Investments in illusory subjects supposed to know exemplify 
the kinds of (mis)identifications proper to the (mal)functioning of 
subjectivisation. The inevitability and, indeed, interminability of 
(mis)identification underpins the status of subjects supposed to know as 
drive objects on which the conscious one fixates—usually without being 
aware of this. Indeed, the inevitability and interminability of failures in 
subjectivisation precisely is that which is elided in self-consciousness. 
The inevitability and interminability in question is, so to speak, “registered” 
on the level of the unconscious—which is to say, by virtue of the 
endlessly repeated insistence of what Žižek refers to as “real entities”. In 
order to make sense of this, I would suggest that, in common with Pfaller 
and interpassivity, we must read certain Žižekian (and, indeed, Lacanian) 
expressions figuratively as opposed to literally. For example, we 
understand that objet a is not an actual object. Similarly, we appreciate 
that there are no such things as causative “real entities” in any literal or 
objective sense. Notwithstanding the many ambiguities that surround 
this term in Lacanian theory, “Real” does not designate the ineffable 
“cause” of subjectivsation per se, but rather defines the limit of our 
capacity to fathom this cause. Here, the critical point is that the 
impossibility of (self-consciously) knowing the cause or ground of 
subjectivisation is synonymous with what we have termed the 
(mal)functioning of subjectivisation such that a fundamentally 
irresolvable relation of tension obtains between self-consciousness and 
otherness. Equivalently, we may say that, paradoxically, subjectivisation 
is a function founded on the very impossibility of its realisation, thereby 
bearing witness to the way in which the field of language-mediated, 
desiring subjectivity necessarily becomes as interwoven with structural 
impasses and impossibilities. In Lacanian terms, these impasses and 
impossibilities are of the order of the Real.75 Thus, the Real-as-
impossibility, synonymous with, yet inassimilable to, subjectivisation 
defines the horizon and limit of subjectivisation. Insofar as 
subjectivisation admits consideration as a function paradoxically 
founded on the impossibility of its realisation, it also might be 




characterised as a productive nothingness. This understanding of 
subjectivisation harmonises with Žižek’s definition of the Lacanian 
subject as “this original void, the lack of symbolic structure... the subject 
of the signifier”.76 It also emphasises for us why the term of analysis and 
escaping subjectivisation must be regarded as unattainable ideals. Qua 
productive nothingness, subjectivisation defines that which becomes 
endlessly ex nihilio—hence, in a sense that is quintessentially “Real”, 
there is no escaping subjectivisation because there is, in the “final 
analysis”, “no-thing” from which to escape.77 
 
Interpassivity vis à vis Relational Aesthetics 
 
In the spirit of Pfaller’s original intentions for interpassivity, let us now try 
to relate these theoretical considerations on interpassivity to the field of 
contemporary art. By way of extending the conversation Pfaller has 
instigated vis à vis the rhetoric of interactivity and participation in the arts, 
we shall apply our ruminations on interpassivity to one particularly 
noteworthy example that is not mentioned specifically in Interpassivity. 
Namely, the so-called “relational art” Nicholas Bourriaud promoted in his 
capacity as curator of group exhibitions like Traffic (held at the CAPC 
musée d’art contemporain de Bordeaux in 1996), and about which he 
theorised in the collection of essays entitled Relational Aesthetics 
(originally published in French in 1998 and in English in 2002). We shall 
also address the objections raised to this advocacy by Claire Bishop in 
her October article “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics” (2004). In the 
course of these deliberations, it will be useful to keep in mind two key 
implications of our (anti-humanist, anti-metaphysical) considerations of 
interpassivity. Firstly, notwithstanding the emphasis of relational art on 
interactivity, we should remember that always already it is the case that 
“interactivity” and “interpassivity” are opposite sides of the same “coin” of 
subjectivisation (or the identifications proper to subjectivisation). 
Relational art clearly is “interactive” to the extent that its being or 
becoming as art relies on audience participation within the compass of 
certain orchestrated situations. However, by the same token, relational 
art is “interpassive” insofar as there is also a delegation of responsibility 
for this being and becoming as art to other people and/or the 




orchestrated situation as such. Thus, from the perspective of the artist (or 
other non-participating spectators), by virtue of this delegation, the 
orchestrated situation inculcates the relational artwork: indeed, insofar as 
the artwork is identical with the orchestrated situation, we may say that 
the artwork inculcates itself. Secondly, we should remain mindful of in 
what the critical efficacy of interpassivity consists. Namely, that, in 
potentia, considerations of interpassivity foment the transition from 
interpassivity-as-delegation to interpassivity-as-resistance that we have 
equated with the traversing of fantasy—at the limit of which, 
subjectivisation is superseded by or disappeared into drive as its 
constitutive ground. In the context of relational art, the fantasies to be 
traversed follow from Pfaller’s aforementioned observation that the 
pervasive rhetoric extolling the virtues of interactivity and audience 
participation in art constituted a “revival of very old wishes and utopias, 
which had become unquestioned facts”—namely, the myth that art has 
the power to promote social emancipation, thereby enabling people to 
attain greater levels of self-realisation and individual freedom. Insofar as 
it perpetuates this myth, the discourse of participation in the arts 
promotes what Pfaller refers to as “the affirmative commissioning of 
individuals under the conditions of postmodern ideology”—a profoundly 
ironic state of affairs wherein the rhetoric of interactivity and participation 
in art engenders the very social conditions to which, ostensibly, it is 
opposed—i.e., a lack of social emancipation.  
 
 A cursory inspection of the opening commentary in Relational 
Aesthetics reveals the degree to which Bourriaud does, indeed, appear to 
be advancing a rhetoric of social emancipation and individual self-
realisation through art that, for Pfaller, epitomises the “affirmative 
commissioning of individuals” proper to postmodern ideology. That 
Bourriaud is presenting arguments for the efficacy of relational art in 
restoring or recovering free and authentic human relations is evident 
from his assertion that contemporary art’s “most burning issue” resides in 
exploring the possibility of enlivening “relationships with the world” 
through “social experiments” and the creation of “hands-on utopias.” In 
offering to realise these possibilities, relational art is proposed as a 
panacea to the contemporary cultural malaise—which is to say, the 




manner by which the proliferation of global networks of commerce and 
communication, and the expansion of electronic media, has reduced free 
and authentic human interactions to a series of rote responses in a 
culture of unbridled consumerism. In this context, the field of consumer 
products (i.e., material items, electronic media), and their modes of 
exchange and consumption, become matrix and measure of “human 
relations”—thereby also defining conceptions of community or social 
identity. In a poststructuralist vernacular one might say that signs of 
human relations (i.e., consumer products, modes of consumption and 
exchange) supplement actual human relations. In Bourriaud’s view, this 
transformation of the “social bond... into a standardised artefact” is 
synonymous with the “final stage” in the emergence of the Debordian 
“Society of the Spectacle”, wherein “human relations are no longer 
‘directly experienced’, but start to become blurred in their ‘spectacular 
representation’.”78  
 
 That said, matters are complicated by Bourriaud’s advocacy of 
relational art only as a limited site of resistance to the invidious effects of 
the Society of the Spectacle. This is evident, for example, in the way 
Bourriaud emphasises how relational art operates within a “minute 
space of daily gestures”, bears witness to “tiny revolutions” in the mesh of 
the quotidian, and produces “micro-communit[ies]” from “momentary 
groupings” of people in exhibition spaces.79 On Bourriaud’s account, 
these features reflect how, in the contemporary cultural context, “Social 
utopias and revolutionary hopes have given way to everyday micro-
utopias and imitative strategies” in which the potential of contemporary 
art to be a locus of cultural criticism and political resistance resides “in 
the invention of individual and collective vanishing lines, in those 
temporary and nomadic constructions whereby the artist models and 
disseminates disconcerting situations.”80 Thus conceived, relational art 
offers to restore or recover free and authentic human relations only 
partially, contingently — from which perspective the notion of such 
relations obtaining (or ever having obtained) in any full or enduring 
fashion is tacitly dismissed as myth. To this extent, the postmodern 
flavour of Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics would seem to inhere in its 
repudiation of the absolutisms and essentialisms of the modern. 




Nevertheless, qua ideology, relational art arguably still “commissions” 
individuals in the way Pfaller suggests — the limited rewards on offer 
justified insofar as the resistance to modernist ideals attests to a greater 
(if not absolute) level of pragmatism and authenticity. To this extent, 
relational art bears witness to a relinquishing of the modernist faith in the 
power of art to bring about truly radical and decisive change — whether 
on the level of society or the individual. If this is not altogether too much 
of an oversimplification, we might say that relation al aesthetics involves 
relinquishing the modernist ideal of Revolution (i.e., the singular, all-
encompassing, and absolutely conclusive advent of personal and/or 
social transformation) in favour of a more pragmatic, postmodernist 
investment in revolutions (multiple, localised, transitory knots and folds 
within the intersubjective social and cultural fabric).  
 
 Here, we may observe that Bourriaud’s vision of relational art 
harmonises with Pfaller’s account of interpassivity in two main respects. 
Firstly, Bourriaud’s characterisation of relational art in terms of “micro-
utopias” and “imitative strategies” bears comparison with Pfaller’s 
suggestion, vis à vis what we have termed interpassivity-as-delegation, 
that interpassive behaviours and structures are “always necessarily 
connected with a seeming miniature staging of the act of enjoyment.” 
Relevant here is the manner by which Bourriaud posits relational art as 
being only partially and contingently efficacious in the restoration or 
recovery of full human relations — i.e., relational art tends to model or 
pantomime in microcosm the mythological condition of full human 
relations. Secondly, considered as strictly limited and transient 
performances in miniature of full human relations, relational artworks 
echo Pfaller’s aforementioned contention that interpassive behaviours 
involve “selective contact with a thing in order, in exchange, to entirely 
escape that very thing”, on which basis interpassivity invites 
interpretation as a “strategy for escaping identification and consequently 
subjectivisation.” The resonance between Bourriaud and Pfaller obtains if 
we equate interpassive “selective contact with a thing” with relational 
art’s modelling or pantomiming things in microcosm. In either case, what 
results are identifications and/or subjectivisations distinguished by 
limitation or failure—and that, by the same token, enliven the possibility 




of a transition to a more critically efficacious condition we have 
characterised as interpassivity-as-resistance. In other words, the critical 
potentials of Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics obtain insofar as 
transitioning from interpassivity-as-delegation to interpassivity-as-
resistance is nascent in any expression of desiring subjectivity. As 
symptoms of the malfunctioning of subjectivisation, always already, 
investments in fantasy are doomed to fail repeatedly. In fading, these 
fantasies bear witness to the possibility of their traversing and, in the 
(unrealisable) limit, the disappearance of subjectivisation as such in the 
face of drive. Thus, with regard to Bourriaud’s advocacy of relational art 
or particular examples of relational art as such, the question that 
confronts us is to what extent these possibilities are actualised. 
 
 It is certainly the case that relational art and Bourriaud’s advocacy 
of it has excited debate—one noteworthy example being Bishop’s 
aforementioned “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics”. Here, among 
other things, Bishop addresses the work of two well-known artists 
associated with Bourriaud and relational aesthetics: Rirkrit Tiravanija and 
Liam Gillick. In the former case, Bishop examines Tiravanija’s “hybrid 
installation performances” such as Untitled (Still) (1992), presented at 303 
Gallery, New York, wherein exhibition venues are transformed into 
“convivial” communal spaces in which visitors are invited to relax, 
converse, consume food prepared by the artist, and so on. In the latter 
event, Bishop discusses Gillick’s interdisciplinary sculptures, installations, 
and conceptual works such as the Pinboard Project (1992) (a bulletin 
board to which participants were invited to rearrange and supplement 
material addressing a predetermined theme) or Big Conference Centre 
Limitation Screen (1998) (an aluminium and Plexiglas structure, 
reminiscent of a corporate office divider, intended to function as a frame 
or backdrop for social exchanges) where, in common with Tiravanija, the 
artwork is less an object than an orchestrated social situation or 
“scenario”.81 In Bishop’s opinion, these works are troubling insofar as they 
emphasise description or representation of social and cultural forms over 
the analysis of such: their reproduction of the social and cultural 
spectacle takes precedence over the generation of genuinely 
interrogative substance and content. Thus, with reference to earlier 




criticism advanced by Janet Kraynak, Bishop observes that, insofar as 
Tiravanija enjoys widespread international exposure, his work does not 
interrogate the logic of globalisation in any thoroughgoing fashion “but 
merely reproduces it.”82 Similarly, Bishop suggests that Gillick’s “design 
structures” address themselves primarily to the form and functioning of 
office environments, as opposed to the manner by which corporate and 
state entities employ workplace design as a mode of social control.83 
Whilst Tiravanija’s performance installations may be occasions for 
community, Bishop considers their political potentials to be barely 
realised beyond the most elementary fact of “advocating dialogue over 
monologue”. Likewise, insofar as Gillick’s constructions focus on 
modelling forms of sociability in workplace environments, as opposed to 
exposing the status of these social forms and spaces as expressions of 
underlying power structures, Bishop finds them to be expressions of a 
“pragmatism... tantamount to an abandonment or failure of ideals... the 
demonstration of a compromise, rather than the articulation of a 
problem.”84 
 
 The problems Bishop identifies with the work of Tiravanija and 
Gillick follow from one of her primary objections to Bourriaud — namely, 
the degree to which he presents relational art’s micro-utopias as 
inherently “positive”, “emancipatory”, and “democratic” expressions of 
harmonious human relations.85 In contesting this view, Bishop invokes 
arguments advanced by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics 
(1985). Here, the idea of democracy is elaborated in light of Lacan’s 
conception of human relations as being inevitably antagonistic insofar as 
they take place among subjects who are “irremediably decentered and 
incomplete.”86 In light of our preceding discussion, we would say that 
human relations define an irresolvable relation of tension between self 
and otherness and are, thus, symptomatic of the intrinsic 
(mal)functioning of subjectivisation. The key point is that, as Bishop 
relates, not only do Laclau and Mouffe understand antagonism to be a 
necessary feature of a “fully functioning democratic society... in which 
relations of conflict are sustained, not erased” — this understanding 
reflects the Lacanian insight that, paradoxically, subjectivisation is 




predicated on the impossibility of its full realisation.87 Among the 
examples Bishop invokes to illustrate the antagonistic dimension of 
relational art are works by Santiago Sierra such as 250cm Line Tattooed 
on Six Paid People (1999), in which actions orchestrated by the artist are 
documented photographically in a manner reminiscent of the 
Conceptual and Performance Art of the 1970s. In stark contrast to the 
appearance of social harmony and reciprocity in works orchestrated by, 
respectively, Tiravanija and Gillick, Sierra’s piece confronts the spectator 
with a far less optimistic vision of human relations insofar as the artist 
pays his collaborators to engage in activities that seem humiliating, futile, 
and which are, quite literally, disfiguring. Whilst Bishop acknowledges 
that Sierra has attracted criticism for his rather nihilistic reflections on 
capitalism, she contends that such opprobrium misses the significance 
of the artist’s work vis à vis relational aesthetics. That is to say, the 
manner by which Sierra’s orchestrated situations sustain and exacerbate 
discordances in the field of subjectivity, thereby exposing Bourriaud’s 
micro-utopias as impossible ideals insofar as they are predicated on the 
phantasms of full and harmonious intersubjective identification.88 
 
 Bishop makes some compelling observations in her assessments 
of the relational art produced by the likes of Tiravanija and Gillick. That 
Bourriaud has promoted some of this work in his capacity as a curator 
also makes him a legitimate target for criticism and, in this regard, 
Bishop’s article is timely and necessary. Nevertheless, we suggest that 
Bishop’s account is, itself, open to criticism vis à vis its interpretation of 
Bourriaud’s ideas. In saying this, we must concede that the question of 
interpretation attends any discourse analysis (which means that “our”—
or, rather, if “I” am to momentarily re-emerge from this hiding place 
behind the royal “we” — “my” interpretations of Pfaller, Lacan, Bourriaud, 
and Bishop are also, inevitably, open to question). Indeed, on the basis of 
the discussion thus far, we are obliged to acknowledge that, always 
already, the interactive dimension of interpretation (the conscious one’s 
phantasmic engagement/identification with other subjects or works in 
making determinations of meaning) is accompanied by an interpassive 
obverse or underside (thereby attesting to the inevitable fading of such 
determinations, the (mal)functioning of subjectivisation, the phenomenon 




of repetition compulsion and, ultimately, the insistence of drive). We 
might characterise this interpassive dimension of interpretation in terms 
of the delegation of the task or enjoyment of interpretation to an illusory 
“naïve interpreter”—a subject supposed to have performed the task of 
interpretation for us. In keeping with the understanding of interpassivity 
advanced thus far, our suggestion is that, in its allusive and circuitous 
aspect, the function of the naïve interpreter is twofold. Firstly, it is the 
phantasm tacitly invoked or appealed to in order to support 
determinations made on the plane of interactivity. Secondly, however, 
qua phantasm, the naïve interpreter simultaneously subverts these 
determinations, ensuring that, always already, they are sustained only in 
their ambiguity, as fading in the face of the insistence of drive.  
 
 In relation to Bishop’s interpretation of Bourriaud, the double 
function of the naïve interpreter insists to the extent that her reading 
strikes us as excessively reductive, absolutist, and totalising. On this 
basis, our most immediate challenge is to traverse Bishop’s fantasy vis à 
vis Bourriaud and relational aesthetics — an operation that is, 
inescapably, a reification of ourselves, our fantasies (the traversing of 
which is, of course, to be performed by our interpreters in turn).89 Having 
made this genuflection, acknowledging the intersubjective nature of the 
conversations within which we are enmeshed, we are now in a position 
to present our objection to Bishop’s argument in more detail. In essence, 
our reservation stems from Bishop’s insistence that Bourriaud 
understands the relations proper to relational aesthetics or relational 
artworks to be “intrinsically democratic” or “fundamentally harmonious... 
because they are addressed to a community of viewing subjects with 
something in common” — i.e., relations taking place in a subjective field 
in which identifications tend towards a certain degree of fulfilment and 
sufficiency.90 This tendency to read Bourriaud as if he considers the 
restoration or recovery of full human relations to be a genuine possibility 
is reiterated in Bishop’s closing comments, where she suggests that 
relational aesthetics is fundamentally problematic insofar as it “requires a 
unified subject as a prerequisite for community-as-togetherness”.91 
However, as we have seen, Bourriaud explicitly repudiates as a 
modernist myth the possibility that art might engender social and/or 




personal transformations in any total or absolute sense. As is implicit in 
their very denomination, the micro-utopias proper to relational aesthetics 
offer only partial and contingent degrees of social emancipation and 
individual self-realisation. Bishop seems to overemphasise the utopian 
dimension of relational aesthetics (i.e., its impetus to perfection) at the 
expense of its microcosmic aspect (i.e., its pragmatic acceptance of 
imperfection). In so doing, she does not appear to appreciate the manner 
by which the microcosmic dimension of relational art harmonises with 
her own position. That is to say, the manner by which relational art as 
microcosm precisely confirms its status as symptomatic of failures in 
subjectivisation — which is to say, the instantiation of inherently 
antagonistic intersubjective human relations—thereby underscoring the 
degree to which Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics is predicated on the 
very impossibility of its full realisation. 
 
 Of course, as suggested earlier, the fact that, in the context of the 
postmodern, Bourriaud conceives of relational aesthetics as a 
necessarily limited project does not excuse him from criticism. The value 
of considering relational art in light of Pfaller’s conception of interpassivity 
is that we glimpse the ideological underpinnings of Bourriaud’s ideas. 
This is the crux of our reservations vis à vis Bishop. When she refers to 
the “feel-good positions adopted by Tiravanija and Gillick”, and the “cozy” 
complicity of certain artists and curators such that “art does not feel the 
need to defend itself... it collapses into compensatory (and self-
congratulatory) entertainment”, Bishop certainly identifies the surface 
symptoms of the limitations and failures of relational art, thereby 
unveiling the “relational antagonism... which is repressed in sustaining 
the semblance of... social harmony”.92 However, in so doing, Bishop 
acknowledges neither the manner by which Bourriaud defines and 
justifies relational aesthetics as limitation and failure, nor the way in 
which this definition/justification is a reflection of postmodern ideology. 
That is to say, the manner by which, paradoxically, relational art’s rhetoric 
of interactivity and participation sustains itself precisely insofar as it fails 
to restore and recover full human relations. In the context of the 
postmodern, relational art’s “affirmative commissioning” of individuals 
bears witness to a repudiation of modernist myths — those oppressive 




and impossible absolutes and ideals by which, formerly, modernism 
dominated the cultural field. In so doing, relational art offers to promote 
human relations characterised by greater pragmatism and authenticity. 
The irony in this is evident in that the discourses of interactivity and 
participation, qua postmodern ideology, continue to subjugate 
individuals in the name of their (now only limited) liberation. Moreover, in 
so doing, these discourses precisely recapitulate the quintessentially 
modernist investment in avant-garde art as a vehicle for representing self 
and society in a real and authentic way, thereby enlivening the (albeit, 
limited) possibility of self-realisation and social emancipation. In this way, 
modernist investments in absolutism and totality apropos reality, 
authenticity, self-realisation and social emancipation are supplemented 
by a postmodernist ethos of relativity and incompleteness—but the 
insistent drive to (degrees of) reality, authenticity, self-realisation and 
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